



YOUTH
CITIZENS
OBSERVERS
NETWORK

الشبكة الشبابية للمراقبة المدنية

الآثار السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية
والإنسانية للحرب المستمرة في السودان

**Political, Social, Economic, and Human
Implications of Sudan's Ongoing War**

January 2024



YCON.SUDAN



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Introduction and Prelude

We are a group of Sudanese youth who are active in various civil society organizations and resistance committees (RCs) across Sudan and are interested in civilian monitoring and peacebuilding. We formed the Youth Citizens Observers Network (YCON) to support democratic transformation in Sudan by activating the role of youth locally.

Our vision is to build a transparent social democracy through civilian monitoring and promoting the principle of good governance in Sudan. Our mission is to empower youth to be the foundation and guarantee for building a democracy that achieves freedom, peace, and justice in Sudan.

When the war in Sudan began in April 2023, the YCON shifted to a platform aimed at monitoring the political, security, and humanitarian situation in Sudan, always seeking to document violations during the war and advocate for peace and the establishment of democracy.

Through our presence in the field in all Sudanese states, we were able to compile and issue many periodic and specialized reports, and we always strive to convey the voice of the Sudanese youth who reject war and constantly call for peace in a free, democratic, and fair country.

The network works hard to elevate the voice of Sudanese youth as a pivotal force on the path to democratic transformation and building a more inclusive and just society that respects human rights and ensures the general welfare of the Sudanese people. Currently, it works on producing periodic reports to monitor and document the repercussions of the war on the Sudanese people, in addition to documenting violations against civilians committed by both sides of the conflict.

Executive Summary

Ten months have passed since the beginning of the war in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). All mediation efforts have failed to reach a formula to stop the fighting, allow humanitarian aid to reach the affected areas, and engage in negotiations between the two warring forces to end the war and establish a new reality in Sudan.

During these ten months, the geographic scope of the war has expanded, encompassing twelve out of the total eighteen states in Sudan. At the same time, its effects on the Sudanese have been catastrophic, with over ten million internally displaced and more than two million refugees in neighboring countries. The effects of the war have reached some neighboring countries and affected Sudan's relations with countries in the region and outside the African continent.

In January, the states under the control of SAF experienced a state of popular mobilization and arming of citizens under what was called popular resistance. This was organized by the SAF leadership in a step that Sudanese people largely disagreed with. Though some support the SAF, others state that arming civilians highlights the army's inability to protect citizens and defend their interests. The popular resistance and arming of citizens were considered by many Sudanese a step towards entering Sudan into a comprehensive war. Indeed, the proliferation of weapons might lead to the emergence of small civil wars, especially given that Sudan is a country with many social imbalances and differences. These grievances have historically led to fierce battles between tribes in the Blue Nile, the East, White Nile, and others. The increased presence of weapons in the hands of citizens threatens their lives.

On the other hand, several signs point to the RSF's lack of political will and, perhaps, control over their field operations. Among these signs are the continuous violations of the RSF against civilians; their failure to implement the terms of the document they signed with the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum), which stipulated that humanitarian aid must reach affected populations in their areas of control.

The humanitarian situation in Sudan is worsening as the war goes on. This is especially true in the Babanusa locality in West Kordofan, which has witnessed ongoing clashes. Thousands of families have fled to nearby villages and cities; thousands of people are suffering from thirst, lack of food, and shelter materials, according to field observers of the YCON.

The situation of the displaced in Darfur and eastern Sudan is also dire. There is almost a complete lack of support except for some local initiatives such as emergency response rooms and some national organizations. Continuous appeals have been launched by residents of the affected areas and displaced people. They desperately need both sides of the conflict to open safe routes for humanitarian aid and to stop the targeting of residential areas with aircraft and heavy weapons, among other essentials highlighted in this month's report.

Political Implications of the War

No significant change in Sudan's political situation was observed in the conflict's ninth month. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit, which was supposed to be held at the end of December between the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Mr. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the commander of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, was postponed. The beginning of the year saw the commander of the RSF making several visits to countries in the IGAD region. A document was also signed between the RSF and the Taqaddum Initiative in Addis Ababa.

On January 23, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour SLM (al-Nur), discussed the situation in Sudan with the Kenyan President, William Ruto, in Nairobi, and Ruto welcomed on his official X account Abdel Wahid's commitment to support IGAD's roadmap to restore peace and stability in Sudan. The official spokesperson for the SLM met with the commander of the RSF, as reported in an interview with Radio Dabanga. This meeting can be seen as part of the movements undertaken by the commander of the RSF in East Africa and his efforts to create alliances and coordination with local and regional actors and armed movements.

On January 16, 2024, the Minister of Federal Governance issued a decision to dissolve the Change and Services Committees, which had been providing services to citizens in coordination with emergency rooms. After this decision, new committees were formed, one of their tasks being to mobilize citizens to arm themselves and fight alongside the SAF in what is known as "popular resistance." These committees are directing their efforts towards mobilizing citizens to take up arms and fight alongside the army. This development indicates a lack of interest (on the part of SAF) in providing services at a time when citizens are suffering from the repercussions of the war and its economic impacts.

Like in previous months, political activity is almost halted in most states of Sudan, with increased repression of political and civil activities due to emergency laws and laws dissolving civil institutions that were recently enacted. This coincided with a wave of arrests in several states, such as Sennar, River Nile, and Kassala. The RSF is also carrying out arrests in Darfur states. YCON local observers reported that on January 14, military intelligence arrested three members of the RCs in Blue Nile state's Damazin, including two members of the Communist Party, under the pretext of participating in RCs. They were released within 24 hours of the arrest. In the Northern State, a security force arrested Alameer Mohammed Ahmed in front of his office in the Karima area of Merowe locality on December 27, 2023, without stating any reasons, and released him on December 30, 2023. The RCs of the Merowe community

condemned the arrest of Alameer Mohammed Ahmed and all the arrests made against citizens, holding the Merowe Local Security Committee responsible for their safety.

The Dongola court sentenced a member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Shams Al-Din Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, to one year in prison based on a report filed against him seven months earlier by a group of National Congress Party (NCP) elements at the Information Crimes Prosecution, following a post he made on Facebook. In the White Nile State, in the city of Rabak, a member of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party was arrested from his workplace and detained for nine days. Similarly, the political office member of the Umma Party and the preacher of Mosque Square 2 was arrested due to his addressing the country's events and was detained for 10 days. Four prominent political leaders in the Um Rawaba locality were arrested and assaulted in their homes and workplaces, and their families were harassed. They were detained for several days and then released. In Khartoum State, arrests and unlawful detentions were carried out by the Negative Phenomena Committees affiliated with the RSF.

Mobilization, rallying, and public armament continue in most states under the control of the SAF. The governor of North Kordofan issued a decision to form the Supreme Committee for Mobilization and Alert. This is part of the mobilization and alert that spans the country; the decision's announcement claimed it was intended to face the security threats and dangers plotted against Sudan. Our observers noted movements in the SAF areas in North Omdurman aimed at calling for mobilization carried out by mosques. In Kassala State, the governor called for Jihad in the Kassala main market mosque and urged citizens to arm themselves to fight with the SAF against the RSF. Meanwhile, in some states with joint control, there are counter-gatherings by those loyal to the RSF, such as in the Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan. In East Nile, Khartoum State, the RSF is conducting mobilization campaigns and attracting tribal and clan leaders through holding conferences in the halls of the local administration. The latest was a meeting with representatives of the Ghulfan tribe from the Nuba Mountains in East Nile on Tuesday, January 23, 2024.

On January 19, the governor of the Darfur region, Minni Arko Minawi, arrived in the locality of Al Dabbah, and he was received by the governor of the Northern State, members of his security committee, and the security committee of Al Dabbah locality. The governor held a joint meeting where many issues were discussed. Some local reports indicated that the armed movements loyal to the army had opened camps in eastern Sudan. Malik Agar also visited the Blue Nile on January 25. In North Kordofan State, the acting governor is moving within the city of Al Obeid, announcing the mobilization and rallying for popular resistance through social events and sports courses. The governor also directed the directors of localities to form

neighborhood committees, whose tasks included mobilizing, rallying, and arming citizens to fight with the army. This was preceded by a decision to form a Supreme Mobilization Committee, which includes some members of the NCP who worked within the Nafeer project implemented by Ahmed Haroun in North Kordofan between 2013 and 2018.

In North Darfur, a meeting was held on January 22 at the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Al-Fashir, which included Hadi Idris Yahya, President of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, attended by the governor, General Nimer Mohamed Abdel Rahman, and the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saleh Osman Mohamed (Jabal Si), his deputies, officers of various units, leaders of battalions, companies, factions, and a large number of officers in Al-Fashir. The purpose of the meeting, according to the statements issued, was an enlightening and consultative meeting. It is worth mentioning that Hadi Idris stated in December that he had contacted the second commander of the RSF and asked him not to attack Al Fashir City. Hadi Idris had previously refused to abandon his neutrality in the current war and to align with one of its parties. He also refused General Burhan's decision to dismiss him from his position as a member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

In the states under the control of the RSF, efforts continue to activate institutions. In Zalingei, Central Darfur, the People's Court Committee expelled the internally displaced persons inside the court and judicial apparatus complex under the pretext of activating the court. The RSF opened it and formed a popular committee headed by Abdel Karim Youssef to manage the state's tasks. Several meetings were held, and sub-committees were formed to manage the state's tasks.

In the Um Rawaba locality, North Kordofan, the RSF controls the state's entrances and exits, where they formed an office for reports and inquiries. According to the testimony of citizens from the locality, the reports office deals harshly, even to the point of elimination, with criminals and suspects. In Khartoum State, some courts and departments were also opened in East Nile to receive complaints and reports, but suspects are treated poorly through beating and flogging before they reach the court. In addition, there are detentions at the bases.

January also witnessed demonstrations in West Kordofan, Al-Fula locality, where citizens in Al-Fula city organized a solidarity march with the SSAF. Suddenly, citizens appeared carrying slogans supporting the SAF in their war against the RSF. The march was protected by several four-wheel drive vehicles belonging to the army and police and ended in front of the government secretariat, where the deputy governor (acting governor) of West Kordofan addressed it, confirming his government's support for the army and thanking the citizens for their stance. Some activists from Al-Fula city expressed their concern and fear on social media

that such demonstrations would bring the war to their doorstep, accusing at the same time those who participated in the march of being members of the NCP only.

Groups of citizens also took to the streets in Al Gezira State, Wad Madani (East Madani neighborhoods (Dardaqa, Hay Nasser, and Hay Al Gezira)), declaring the slogan "No to War," and the RSF, which have controlled Wad Madani and most of Al Gezira State since last December, did not confront them.

January also witnessed several activities and movements by the native administrations in various areas in South Kordofan State. Citizens of Al Tadamon locality held a meeting on Sunday, January 14, which included the Al Kawahla Emirate's deputy emir, the city's mayor, the youth, merchants, and notables. The meeting discussed the executive director's practices against the sons of the land, as they described them, and the actors, whom they described as belonging to the RSF and tightening the security grip on them. The city of Kadugli witnessed the opening of reports in January at the instigation of the governor against several political activists and RCs. Some of them were arrested by the security police before local figures intervened and released them, in addition to suspending the rest of the reports. The roles of the native administration appeared in Jabal Oliya locality, Khartoum State, where the native administration leaders moved to fill administrative vacancies and launched some initiatives that contributed to creating a kind of stability and reassurance in the local community.

Recommendations

- Establish a special record of violations in areas controlled by both parties to the conflict for later use in justice procedures and redressing the victims.
- Pressure both parties to the war to resort to a negotiated solution.
- End unlawful arrests.
- Adopt media discourses against calls for armament, which represent a threat to Sudan's unity and warn of the outbreak of civil wars in several areas.

Social Implications of the War

As the war continues into its tenth month, its social repercussions continue. The expansion of the conflict in Al Gaziera State has led to increased displacement to safer states, causing social effects, including some friction between displaced people and host communities, some of which took on a stigmatizing nature. The war has increased unemployment across all states

of Sudan, with a noticeable increase in street vendors, workers in marginal professions, and child labor, along with increased rates of theft and the number of beggars. There has also been observed an increase in sexual exploitation of women.

Citizens continue to live in fear and concern about the situation and threats they receive through social media from the RSF. Their threats to reach safe areas have made citizens feel unstable, affecting their psyche and increasing their fear daily. The prolonged duration of the war has led to deteriorating mental health among citizens, with an increase in psychological trauma affecting people's lives and behavior. Additionally, digital platforms have become sites for exchanging hate speech, especially in Darfur states. In West Darfur, some non-Arab tribes continue to face ongoing violations and threats. In the eastern localities of South Kordofan, there is an increase in looting on the roads and fears among Arab tribes following events in Heiban and Deleng localities of targeting their citizens for alleged affiliation with the RSF. The prevalence of hate speech may have been influenced by some of the political and field leaders' rhetoric on both sides of the conflict, calling for the mobilization of citizens for armament and joining the fight, posing a threat to social cohesion and warning of a transition to a civil war phase.

In general, there has been a decrease in social activities in Khartoum State recently. However, there have been some humanitarian gatherings, such as neighborhood kitchens - communal kitchens where families who can provide food take their meals, representing social solidarity in Sudan. In many neighborhoods in Karari locality, sports activities continue, especially in neighborhoods 95 and 96. In North Darfur, despite the war conditions, the Sultans' band organized a theater show on the evening of Friday, January 26, 2024, at Abu Shouk IDP camp in Al Fasher, Block 15, contributing to relieving the community from psychological pressure and the atmosphere of war. Also, in collaboration with Nour Cultural Center, the Awn Al-Muhtajeen Charity Association organized a cultural program on the morning of "Friday," January 26, at Al Thawra Secondary School for Girls for IDPs from Nyala and Al Fasher. The program included lectures on psychological and social support and how to manage economic projects through training and qualifying IDPs in various fields to empower them economically. These activities and events are carried out by charitable initiatives and youth associations in the neighborhood. Still, conflict parties sometimes exploit them for mobilization and calling citizens to fight. In North Kordofan, the acting governor exploited sports festivals in neighborhoods of Al Obeid city during January and used them to call for mobilization, popular rallying, and armament. This is coordinated by the newly formed mobilization committees.

Recommendations

- Open safe corridors for humanitarian aid delivery.
- Press for the delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced people in closed areas.
- Secure humanitarian convoys and workers for the easy transfer and flow of goods and humanitarian aid.
- Find solutions to obstacles in front of humanitarian efforts, including complicated procedures regarding humanitarian supplies.
- Improve the delivery of humanitarian aid to all those in need in the states, as relief materials only reach a few of the millions in need.
- Call all human rights organizations to protect civilians according to international human rights charters.
- Activate activities that enhance social spirit, such as psychological and artistic support to overcome social effects.
- Combat hate speech and call for peace.

Economic Implications of the War

Due to the war, the majority of Sudan's population now requires assistance. Government sector employees have not received their salaries since the start of the war in most states, and business owners have halted their operations. The government has not presented any plans to manage this crisis, nor has it moved to provide assistance to displaced people and citizens who have lost their income sources. Instead, it has mobilized everyone to support the war effort. In the Northern State, mining companies donated 10 kilograms of gold from each company to support the armed forces. Meanwhile, the Chamber of Commerce donated one million dollars on January 21, followed by a donation from a gold merchant, who now holds the position of chairman of the People's Committee for Supporting the SAF in Al Dabbah locality, of two million dollars, in addition to opening 23 camps to train citizens in the use of weapons. These significant amounts are spent on the war effort while most residents of the Northern State suffer from a lack of food, and the displaced suffer from a lack of food, with many begging in markets for food.

The Kordofan states suffer from high food prices, made costly by the arrival of goods to cities through roads controlled by the RSF. Merchants pay large sums in bribes and tolls to checkpoints of the RSF, doubling prices and increasing the burden on citizens who have lost their income sources since the beginning of the war. In Kordofan, power outages and communication network disruptions present additional challenges for those who rely on transfers from relatives outside Sudan.

Most states suffer from a shortage of fuel, which is available on the black market at high prices, affecting internal transportation and increasing the cost of goods. Also, most banks are closed, especially in cities controlled by the RRSF. Some of these banks were robbed in broad daylight by members of the RRSF. Witnesses among the citizens reported seeing individuals carrying bags of money and office furniture out of the banks.

Recommendations

- The state must fulfill its duties towards citizens by paying salaries and ensuring the delivery of aid.
- The RSF should bring the declarations made by their leaders to reality and prevent their members from attacking banks and taking tolls on goods arriving in cities for public consumption.
- Conduct a comprehensive survey of shelters and interventions to provide food and medical aid.

Human Rights Situation and Civilian Protection

In January, violations of human rights against civilians have been increasingly recurring, more than before. There is a frightening and increasing targeting of activists, volunteers in shelters and emergency rooms, politicians, social media influencers, and resistance committees. Often, this targeting takes on a tribal character. The security forces (Central Reserve Police, military intelligence, mobilizers) engage in arbitrary arrests, suppression of freedoms, and repression, as happened in the Blue Nile region, Sennar State, Al Qadarif State, Kassala State, North Kordofan State, South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Khartoum State, River Nile State, and Northern State.

The RSF also engages in arrests of youth, often directly executing them under the pretext of their affiliation with the SAF. There are also incidents of kidnapping civilians by the RSF and

demanding financial ransoms from their families for their release, as happened in Khartoum State, especially in the Soba East area near Sheikh Mustafa Al-Fadni, and in the Kordofan states, especially North Kordofan State.

There, several civilians were arrested under the pretext of their affiliation with the SAF. The states and areas controlled by the RSF witness widespread arrest campaigns of activists and civilians in Al Jazirah State, West Darfur, South Darfur, North Darfur, and especially in Khartoum State, particularly in the East Nile area, accusing them of affiliation with military intelligence. Violations against civilians by both sides of the conflict continue, with several deaths recorded in states experiencing repeated clashes. In North Kordofan State, three civilians were executed under the pretext of their affiliation with the RSF, which was later proven incorrect, creating a state of dissatisfaction and anger among the citizens of Al-Obeid, who now fear being executed merely on suspicion without verification. Several buses on the Al-Obeid Kosti Road were subjected to looting, theft, and killing of some citizens, leading to reduced movement and weakened travel between Al-Obeid City and White Nile State. Travelers from the Kordofan states to the White Nile state face severe violations by the RRSF, including extortion, harassment, looting, and killing if any resistance or refusal is shown.

In Khartoum State, the RSF continue to violate human rights, killing civilians, raping women and girls, and looting and stealing citizens' properties in several localities they control within Khartoum State, such as the East Nile, Bahri, Omdurman, Dar es Salaam, and Ombadda.

On December 27, they raped a volunteer in the Bahri emergency room, according to a statement from the Bahri Emergency Room. They also attacked the Angola area in Ombadda on December 31, with hundreds of armed soldiers and mobilizers, resulting in the death of 9 youths and the arrest of several citizens, along with sexual harassment cases against women. The RSF also carried out artillery shelling in the Karari locality, area 59, near the Al-Tahami Medical Center on the second day of January, killing 6 adults and children from one family, completely destroying their home. On January 19, the army carried out artillery shelling in Omdurman, Ombadda area (Al-Sinaia Angola), resulting in the death of 18 civilians, mostly children, and 24 injured, and the destruction of 4 houses. Violations by both parties in Khartoum State continue and increase. Without an agreement to stop the war, these violations will continue on a larger scale and spread to semi-safe areas.

In White Nile State and Kassala State, due to the proliferation of arms, there is random shooting on roads by mobilizers, injuring more than five citizens and killing three in Kassala State by armed mobilizers in civilian clothes and masks, causing terror and panic among citizens.

The human rights situation in Al Gazirah State is worsening, with increasing rates of theft and armed intimidation. The RSF is intensifying its search for individuals linked to the SAF. The East Al Gazirah Emergency Room announced a severe shortage of chronic disease medications. There is also a significant shortage of other medicines and medical staff in the few hospitals operating in the state. In the Al Kamlin locality, a delegation from the RSF visited on January 14, met with the residents, promised protection, announced the opening of the hospital and markets, and called for mutual cooperation. Amid the current situation, our local observers' reports show grave human rights violations linked to the RSF in specific areas, with information indicating these violations in the following places:

- **Al Hasahisa locality:** Arbitrary arrests and torture of citizens by the RSF, which also attacked the Kampo Haj Ali neighborhood in the western direction of Al Hasahisa and raided all the houses in the neighborhood in search of army personnel and mobilizers. When they found nothing, they tortured the residents, including men, women, and children.
- **Umm Al-Qura locality:** Escalation of violence in the Forty Market, resulting in more than 21 deaths and several injuries. Attacks on Wad Al-Nabihi and Al-Hussainab villages caused several casualties.
- **East Al Gazirah locality:** Imposition of restrictive laws related to public appearance by the RSF.
- The recruitment of children under 18 years old confirms non-compliance with international treaties and conventions related to childhood. The forces also assaulted medical staff at the Rufaa Hospital on January 18, subjecting them to severe beatings and accusing them of collaborating with the SAF. These violations are carried out against opponents or individuals suspected of belonging to the SAF or army mobilizers.
- **North Darfur State** on January 9, 2024: Clashes between the army and RSF in Al Fasher in the northeastern neighborhoods after some RSF members infiltrated.
- **South Darfur State** on January 11, 2024: Residential areas in Nyala were attacked, resulting in injuries and destruction of civilian homes and vital facilities, including Shifaa Kir Hospital, other institutions like the old Nyala Mosque, Sudani Telecommunications Company, and Nyala Train Station. The army used air raids targeting specific areas north of the city, such as the Airport, Riyadh, and Al-Tadamon neighborhoods, as well as the eastern area of Souq Al-Malja and areas surrounding the General Command area. Security is absent in the capital, Nyala, with no police, prosecution, or judiciary

presence. There are no organizations providing services to displaced people in shelters and camps, where they live in extremely complex conditions.

- Central Darfur State:** The humanitarian situation remains critical, with shelters suffering from a lack of food and weak water supplies, along with a shortage of drinking water with varying degrees according to urgent needs. Some internal centers, such as Al-Shaimaa, Al-Istiraha, and Rafidah, are partially filled, indicating an upcoming health threat. Additionally, the rate of acute malnutrition is increasing in educational centers, such as Zalingei University, Al-Shamaliyat Schools, and the Police School, and inside Al-Istiraha hostel, with the arrival of winter and the increasing number of displaced people in shelters. Individuals suffer from a lack of humanitarian aid and medical care, along with a shortage of blankets to protect against the cold, leading to the spread of diseases, especially among children, the elderly, and those with chronic diseases.
- South Kordofan State** on January 3, 2024: 3 murders occurred in Al Dalanj city, resulting in 20 deaths and numerous injuries, including children and women, by unknown assailants. On January 12, 2024, the Hawazma tribes were expelled from Al Dalanj city by the army, accusing them of supporting the RSF. The situation also faces security challenges due to the general state of war in the country and widespread arrest campaigns against activists by the Sudanese army's security forces.
- The militarization of public spaces and power and communication network outages are factors hindering work and communication in the eastern region of South Kordofan State. The localities of Rashad and Al-Abassiya are experiencing a complete shutdown of communication networks, and parts of the Al-Tadamun locality are affected, hampering communication amid the difficult conditions in the eastern region. The health sector and people with chronic diseases struggle to access healthcare and life-saving medications with an almost complete absence of government interventions and civil society organizations. Amid escalating hate speech, members of RCs and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) are threatened and harassed by security agencies and NCP members. War has also affected electricity and telecommunications services, which are out of service in several states, such as Sennar State, Al Jazirah State, Kordofan states, and Darfur states.
- West Kordofan:** There are no official arrests, but individuals returning from Khartoum are pursued by military intelligence, suspected of belonging to the RSF. Isolated incidents occur in this context, as well as recorded cases of theft and robbery on roads, reflecting a lack of security and rampant crime. Citizens lack sufficient security to

ensure normal life activities. The absence of a security system affects the judiciary, police, courts, and prosecution, leading to an expansion of organized and unorganized violations and crimes.

- The violations continue by unruly elements against some minorities in Al-Nuhud locality through threats and robbery. The situation recurs in Babanusa locality, with a list of names of wanted civil activists and politicians by military intelligence. In Al-Khawi locality, community cohesion prevails without human rights violations at present. There is minimal community activity by youth centers to spread awareness and participate in cultural and sports programs. Some civil society organizations provide support to the poor and displaced.
- Refugees and the Need for International Assistance: The war has impacted refugees from South Sudan, leaving them without shelter or food, and they rely on searching for sustenance in markets and restaurants.

Recommendations

- Initiate comprehensive investigations into human rights violations in all states of Sudan.
- Pressure both parties of the conflict to complete negotiations and stop the war.
- Pressure for the opening of safe passages for the delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced people and those in need.
- Reduce tribal polarization in the current war to prevent a potential civil war in the near future.
- Both parties of the conflict must protect civilians under the law of civilian protection in war and human rights laws.
- The SAF and RSF must control and hold their members accountable for any errors, murders, or violations of citizens' rights.

Movement of Migration and Displacement

The displacement of citizens fleeing death did not stop during the month of January. In the states of Darfur, after the intensification of air raids on cities, large numbers of citizens fled to safer areas, and some went to nearby camps, such as Atash and Kalma camps near Nyala city

in South Darfur. Some also sought refuge in neighboring countries, especially from the city of Geneina, which continued to see refugee movements to Chad. In North Darfur, the displaced live in tragic conditions due to the lack of organizations that provide support; where some began to evacuate the camps and return to the cities, especially in the localities of Lait, Tine, and Kuma locality, which have about 18,180 displaced people in need of food, shelter materials, and drinking water. Also, about 15,000 displaced people had arrived at Zamzam camp and were hosted by the older displaced people, and our local observer reported the spread of fever among children with the absence of health services, except for one center belonging to Médecins Sans Frontières that only receives 60 patients a day, while the number far exceeds that.

Blue Nile region, hosting about 100,000 displaced people according to approximate statistics, is experiencing extremely difficult conditions. No assistance has been provided to them by government agencies or organizations, and most are hosted by their relatives. Some of these numbers are from tribal events that the region witnessed last year, while the vast majority moved to the region from Khartoum and Al Gezira states. In the state of Al Gezira, which is controlled by RSF, the displacement continues, with some citizens returning to their homes. The return and exit from some areas are coordinated with the RSF, where a joint emergency room was formed in the locality of East Al Gezira at the beginning of January 2024. There is also internal displacement, especially in the Al Managil locality, which is considered the most stable locality in Al Gezira state and where health services and markets with available goods are available despite their high prices.

White Nile state was greatly affected by the events in Al Gezira state, where it received large numbers of displaced people, and the major cities witnessed displacement to villages due to citizens' fear of attacks on Rabak and Kosti cities. The shelter centers in Rabak city reached 157 centers, while Al Dueim city witnessed 67 shelter centers housing 1,289 families, according to the field survey report issued by the state's Social Welfare Administration on January 25, 2024.

Kordofan states, greatly affected by the war, witnessed cases of internal displacement and some cases of refuge to neighboring countries. According to statistics by network observers, Um Rawaba locality in North Kordofan alone has received more than 53,000 displaced people scattered among the locality's administrations and villages, with 15 shelter centers in Um Rawaba city housing 65 families, while the rest are distributed in the administrations and villages. Al Obeid City, the capital, has 124 shelter centers for the displaced. As for West Kordofan state, Babanusa locality in the west of the state is witnessing large waves of displacement towards Al Majlad locality and the neighboring villages after the recent clashes

between the SAF and RSF and the military air raids on the city. The situation of the displaced is extremely complex, and no intervention has been made to assist them by any official body or international organization, except for some popular efforts. The displaced need shelter materials, food, and medicine. As for South Kordofan state, the displacement movement increased after the takeover of Al Gezira state, where a number of citizens of the White Nile moved to localities in East South Kordofan such as Turtur, Al Abbasiya, and Al Rashad. This is in addition to the displacement of numbers from Al Dilling locality to West and North Kordofan. The displaced in Al Dibeibat City suffer from a lack of aid; some of them sleep on the streets due to the scarcity of shelter centers, and they suffer from the effects of the winter season.

Khartoum state witnessed the return of the displaced from Al Gezira state to Khartoum and East localities, while some areas witnessed internal displacement from Omdurman to Karari locality after the intensification of clashes between the SAF and RSF, especially in neighborhoods 5 and 7.

In the eastern states, the displacement movement to Al Qadarif and Kassala states is increasing, where the number of shelter centers increased, while there are no aids except those provided by local initiatives, which are insufficient. As for the River Nile state, many of the displacement cases that come to the state consider it a transit point, where they continue their journey to Egypt through smuggling, and the same in the Northern state.

Recommendations

- Provide life-saving medicines, especially for children and the elderly with chronic diseases.
- Conduct an advocacy campaign to pressure for the protection of civilians, especially in shelter centers and displacement camps.
- Open safe pathways for delivering humanitarian aid to the displaced.
- Pressure both sides of the conflict to respect human rights and international humanitarian law by not bombing populated areas.